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Abstract
Risk-free assets denominated in US currency not only o¤er
a pecuniary return, but also provide transactions services,
both nationally and internationally. Accordingly, the re-
sponses of bilateral US dollar exchange rates to interest rate
shocks should di¤er substantially with respect to the (US or
foreign) origin of the shock. We demonstrate this empirically
and apply a model of liquidity premia on US treasuries orig-
inating from monetary policy implementation. The liquidity
premium leads to a modication of uncovered interest rate
parity (UIP), which is able to explain observed deviations of
exchange rate dynamics from UIP predictions. In line with
empirical evidence, the model predicts an appreciation of
the US dollar subsequent to an increase in US interest rates
as well as in SOE interest rates.
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1 Introduction
We study the role of liquidity premia on assets for exchange rate responses to changes in monetary
policy rates. Our starting point consists of two observations. First, standard open economy macro
models typically involve a version of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), which states that the
expected rate of depreciation is equal to the di¤erential between home and foreign short-term
interest rates. However, it is well established that this theoretical prediction is rarely conrmed by
empirical data (see Froot and Thaler, 1992, or Engel, 2013, for surveys on the evidence). Second,
returns on certain types of assets can be a¤ected by the existence of liquidity premia. At least
short-term treasuries arguably help to facilitate market transactions, for example through their
use as collateral, and the liquidity services these assets provide are non-pecuniary benets that are
reected in their price (see e.g. Longsta¤, 2004, or Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012).
The point we make in this paper results from combining these two observations. Specically, we
argue that the failure of the UIP prediction, i.e. the observed lack of association between interest
rate di¤erentials and expected depreciation rates, may be partly due to movements in endogenous
liquidity premia. We present a macroeconomic approach to modelling a liquidity premium on
treasuries, which originates from monetary policy implementation, and show that its endogenous
movements can contribute to explaining observed deviations from UIP predictions. In particular,
endogenous liquidity premia give a reason why a currency appreciates for a prolonged time span
subsequent to an increase in the domestic interest rate. To see this, note that when the domestic
monetary policy rate increases, the price of money in terms of the collateral required in open
market operations (typically treasury securities) also increases, such that the liquidity premium on
treasuries falls. With rational investors, arbitrage freeness leads to a modied UIP condition that
takes into account both the pecuniary and the non-pecuniary (i.e. the liquidity service) components
of the total returns on treasuries. It implies that an observed increase in home interest rates and the
resulting international interest rate di¤erential overstates the impact on the exchange rate, given
that part of the interest rate increase is o¤-set by the endogenous change in the liquidity premium.
Indeed, we show that when foreign interest rates show a moderately positive association with home
interest rates (a property that is borne out empirically), the e¤ect of a monetary policy induced
home interest rate increase may well be a subsequent appreciation instead of a depreciation.
The association of a home interest rate increase with a subsequent exchange rate appreciation
is precisely what has been found by a number of empirical studies. Most notably, Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995) have presented VAR evidence pointing out that a contractionary U.S. monetary
policy shock leads the dollar to appreciate for many periods, until it peaks after around three years,
which they explain as delayed overshooting. More recently, Scholl and Uhlig (2008) reconrm
the result and nd that the exchange rate peaks between 17 and 26 months after a monetary
shock. These ndings are in contrast to UIP predictions, and as such have proven di¢ cult to
1
explain (see Engel, 2013). Our approach to account for transaction services of treasuries leads to
an endogenous liquidity premium that can contribute to explaining the observed exchange rate
reactions to changes in interest rates di¤erentials. We show that  when we account for the
observed degree of co-movement between interest rates  the model can rationalize an expected
appreciation following a home interest rate increase, much as found in the empirical studies quoted
above.3 We demonstrate that the endogenous liquidity premium can help explaining the impulse
response of the exchange rate with respect to monetary policy shocks, though it cannot fully
solve the puzzling nding that regressions of depreciation rates on interest rate di¤erentials (as
performed e.g. by Fama, 1984, and surveyed in Froot an Thaler, 1992) notoriously tend to nd
coe¢ cients much smaller than the value of one that is predicted by UIP, and sometimes even nd
negative coe¢ cients.
The model we use is an open economy version of the one in Reynard and Schabert (2013), where
the liquidity premium is shown to behave according to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensens
(2012) evidence and to be able to explain the observed systematic spread between (real) monetary
policy rates and the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (see Canzoneri et al. 2007 and
Atkeson and Kehoe 2009). While several theoretical approaches have emphasized that assets other
than money may be valued for their transactions services (see e.g. Bansal and Coleman, 1996,
Canzoneri et al., 2008, Linnemann and Schabert, 2010), the precise way in which assets provide
liquidity is left open. In contrast, the approach by Reynard and Schabert (2013) explicitly derives
the liquidity value of treasuries from the property that they are eligible in open market operations,
and can thus be transformed into central bank money at a cost which is given by the policy rate.
As an implication, returns on treasuries and on non-eligible assets di¤er by an endogenous liquidity
premium that varies with the stance of monetary policy. We embed this in a model of the US
viewed as a large open economy that interacts with the rest of the world consisting of small open
economies. We recognize the fact that its currency has a special role in the international payments
system, in that large parts of trade are conducted in US dollar, which has been labelled as key
currency pricing by Canzoneri et al. (2013a).4 Since assets that give access to US currency are
therefore particularly valuable for their holders in comparison to assets denoted in other currencies
that are less important in international trade, it follows that changes in US interest rates are
predicted to have di¤erent consequences than changes in interest rates of any small open economy.
We assess the empirical validity of this implication of our model by means of a panel vector
autoregression with monthly data from the US and a number of small open economies. We nd
that in line with earlier empirical evidence an increase in the US monetary policy rate leads to
3 In related literature, it has been noted that there may be other ways in which modelling the liquidity value of
bonds may help with international empirical puzzles, such as exchange rate volatility puzzle or the Backus-Smith
puzzle, as demonstrated by Canzoneri et al. (2013a).
4Canzoneri et al. (2013a) analyze costs and benets of the particular status of the US dollar. Hoermann and
Schabert (2012) examine the impact of key currency pricing on exchange rate dynamics in a two-country model.
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a prolonged period of appreciation.5 This violation of the UIP prediction is compatible with our
model if the small open economy interest rate responds moderately positively to a US interest rate
increase. We show that this is fullled empirically, since the average small open economy interest
rate has a peak response of slightly less than one half of the peak increase of the US rate (while there
is no comparable reaction of US rates to interest rate shocks in small open economies). Further, a
monetary tightening through an interest rate increase in the average small open economy triggers a
response of bilateral exchange rates with respect to the dollar that is qualitatively more in line with
the UIP prediction, in that it produces an almost immediate increase in the depreciation rate of the
small open economy currency with respect to the dollar. The empirical nding that there is hardly
any deviation from UIP predictions when considering small open economies (whose currencies are
not prominent in international trade) is compatible with Bjornland (2009), who conrmed that
depreciation of the small open economy currency follows an domestic interest rate increases for
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden. In the context of our model, it is possible to explain
both an appreciation of the US dollar subsequent to increases in the US monetary policy rate and
in non-US interest rates. The reason is that an increase in the US policy rate (i.e. the Federal
Funds Rate) raises the rate on US treasuries and involves a reduction in their liquidity premium,
which is a special property of assets giving access to US currency. According to our model, the
liquidity premium together with the empirically observed positive international linkage of nominal
policy interest rates is able to account for the US dollar appreciation following an increase in US
interest rates relative to foreign interest rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence supporting
the view that bilateral exchange rates between the US dollar and the currencies of small open
economies deviate from the prediction of UIP when US monetary policy shocks are considered,
while UIP is not rejected for interest rate shocks originating from small open economies. Section
3 presents the model, whereupon section 4 analytically derives the main result for a simplied
model version. The quantitative properties of a parameterized version of the model are discussed
in section 5; section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence on asymmetries in the exchange rate responses to
monetary policy shocks of di¤erent origins, which are suggestive of the role of liquidity premia on US
assets in explaining deviations from UIP. In particular, we follow Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and
estimate VAR models to assess the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates. In contrast
to previous studies that either focus on US monetary policy shocks or on interest rate di¤erentials
5Engel (2012) and Canzoneri et al. (2013b) also discuss how transaction services of bonds can contribute to
international empirical puzzles. They model liquidity of bonds in an implicit way, which tend to lead to a positive
sign rather than the observed negative sign for the correlation between the rate of depreciation and the interest rate
di¤erential.
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(see Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995, Scholl and Uhlig, 2008), we distinguish between shocks to
US monetary policy and shocks to monetary policy in a number of small open economies (SOE
henceforth) for which comparable data are available. We show that, using recursively identied
VARs with monthly data, as already emphasized in previous literature (Eichenbaum and Evans,
1995, Scholl and Uhlig, 2008) there is a pronounced and prolonged appreciation subsequent to a US
policy rate shock. However, we nd that this behavior of exchange rates is much less pronounced
in response to a shock to the monetary policy rate of SOEs. The latter nding is similar to
the results reported by Bjornland (2009) in her study of four small open economies (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Sweden). Our ndings suggest that these results could be explained by the
special role of US assets and the liquidity value that they provide to their holders. Specically,
we nd an unexpected increase in the US short-run nominal interest rate to be followed by several
months of a decreasing US dollar exchange rate (hence an appreciation), while an unexpected
increase to money market interest rates in small open economies that do not share the USs
special role in international nance leads to a more immediate appreciation of the SOE currency
followed by depreciation, consistent with UIP. We interpret this evidence as suggestive for the
property of US assets that are valued for their liquidity services by domestic investors as well as by
international investors; the latter accounting for the specic role of the US dollar as a key currency
for international transactions.
We use monthly data to estimate a panel VAR model capturing the average bilateral interaction
between the US and a number of SOEs (listed below). The VAR is estimated in the vector of
variables Zt = [xUSt ; 
US
t ; R
m;US
t ; R
US
t ; x
i
t; 
i
t; R
i
t; S
i
t ]
0. The superscript US denotes US variables,
whereas the superscript i refers to one out of the group of small open economies for which all data
are available at monthly frequency. The variable xt is the growth rate of industrial production,
t is the CPI ination rate, R
m;US
t is the short-run nominal policy interest rate, taken to be
the Federal Funds Rate for the US, RUSt is the US three months treasury bill rate, whereas
Rit is the interest rate on three months treasury securities for the SOEs
6, and Sit is the log of
the nominal bilateral exchange rate between the i-th country and the US dollar (denoted such
that a decrease indicates a nominal appreciation). A monetary policy shock is an innovation
to the orthogonalized residual of the nominal interest rate equation. Identication is achieved
similarly to Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) by assuming a contemporaneous recursive ordering
where the variables are ordered as given in the denition of Zt. This entails the assumption that
US monetary policy can react contemporaneously to innovations in US production growth and
ination, but interest rate shocks a¤ect the former two variables only after a lag of at least one
month. Likewise, the central bank of the i-th small open economy is able to react to innovations in
both domestic and US production and ination, while there is a one month lag before interest rate
6Due to limited data availability, for three out of the ten countries considered below (Denmark, Finland, and the
Netherlands), we had to use the IMFs measure of overnight interest rates instead.
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shocks a¤ect these. The nominal exchange rate, being ordered last, can react contemporaneously
to all shocks. Furthermore, by ordering US variables rst, it is assumed that US variables are
a¤ected only with at least a one month lag to shocks in the small open economy, whereas the
latters variables all respond immediately to US shocks. The results, however, not dependent on
the recursive identication assumption. Bjornland (2009) uses a long-run restriction approach for
the identication of monetary shocks (in quarterly data, where the recursiveness assumption is
more critical) by imposing a zero long-run e¤ect of monetary policy on the real exchange rate.
The results are similar when using her approach.7
Monthly data on seasonally adjusted industrial production, consumer price indices, the overnight
nominal interest rate and the bilateral exchange rate with respect to the US dollar are obtained
from the IMF International Financial Statistics database. The group of small open economies
consists of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Sweden. The data series mostly begin in 1975m1 except for Finland, where data availability starts
in 1977m12, Germany, where it starts in 1975m5, and Italy, where it starts in 1977m2. For the
countries that joined the Euro area in 1999, the series end in 1998m12, whereas for the remaining
countries the data end in 2008m12. We determine the lag length using the Schwarz information
criterion. For all two country pairs, this criterion suggests either using one or two lags. We conse-
quently use a two lag specication for the VAR, though we checked that using only one or up to six
lags would not lead to di¤erent conclusions. Furthermore, entering the price level and industrial
production variables in log-levels, instead of growth rates, produces very similar results.
We estimate the model in the form of a non-balanced panel VAR with country xed e¤ects (as
in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2012, the sample size is large enough to allow us to neglect
the possible source of bias from correlation between xed e¤ect and regressors as identied by
Nickell, 1981). Also, we checked that estimating individual two country VARs and averaging
the results instead of using a panel approach lead to very similar conclusions. We compute the
impulse responses of the nominal exchange rate with respect to an orthogonalized positive one
unit shock to the US nominal policy interest rate Rm;USt (indicating a monetary policy shock in
the US) and with respect to an orthogonalized positive one unit shock to the nominal interest
rate Rit (indicating a monetary policy shock in the average SOE). In gure 1, we show two sets
of impulse responses, along with bootstrapped two standard deviation bands, namely in each row
those of the US treasury rate RUSt , the SOE treasury rate R
i
t, and the bilateral exchange rate S
i
t .
The rst row of panels shows responses to a unit shock to the US nominal policy interest rate,
and the second row of panels those to a shock to the SOE interest rate. For better readability,
in the gure the exchange rate responses are presented from the point of view of the country in
7Thus, while Bjornland (2009) interprets the di¤erence between her results and those of Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995) and related studies as a result of di¤erences in the identication strategy, our results suggest that the di¤erence
is rather due to the asymmetry between US and SOE interest rate shocks that our model seeks to explain.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to US monetary policy shock (rst row) and to SOE monetary policy
shock (second row).
which the monetary policy shock occurs. Thus, a decrease of the exchange rate following a US
monetary policy shock (upper right panel) means an appreciation of the US dollar with respect to
the small open economys exchange rate, whereas a decrease of the exchange rate following a SOE
monetary policy shock (lower right panel) means an appreciation of the small economys exchange
rate vis-a-vis the US dollar.
The upper row of panels in gure 1 displays a result that is well known from previous studies:
in response to a US monetary tightening, the US treasury rate RUSt that is shown in the upper
left panel increases persistently, and the US dollar appreciates (relatively to the SOE currencies
in the sample) with a pronounced hump-shaped pattern with a peak response that occurs almost
30 months after the shock (upper right panel). This continuing appreciation for around two years
after an interest rate increase is a clear violation of uncovered interest rate parity. As can be seen
from the middle panel in the rst row, the SOE interest rate reacts strongly positively to a US
monetary tightening. However, the increase in the SOE interest rate is less than one for one, such
that the spread between the US treasury rate and the treasury rate in the SOE increases. Hence,
from standard UIP reasoning one would expect an immediate decline in the exchange rate followed
by a subsequent depreciation of the US dollar, and thus an upward sloping response in the upper
right panel, the opposite of which actually occurs.
On the other hand, looking at the second row of panels in gure 1 shows that the predictions
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of uncovered interest rate parity are compatible with the responses that follow a SOE monetary
policy shock. A monetary shock induced increase in the SOE nominal interest rate (lower middle
panel) spurs only a very limited reaction of the US interest rate, and is thus almost equal to an
increase in the SOE interest rate relatively to the US interst rate. As the lower right panel shows,
this leads to a subsequent depreciation, as the uncovered interest parity proposition suggests.
To summarize, two main results can be taken from this analysis. First, an increase in the US
interest rate due to a monetary policy tightening leads to an increase the SOE nominal interest
rate, though the connection between US and SOE interest rates is far from perfect. Measured at
the peaks of the impulse responses, roughly 50% of a US interest rate increase is reected in SOE
interest rate increases. Second, and most importantly, we nd that exchange rate movements
subsequent to US treasury rate changes are inconsistent with standard UIP, whereas there is a
response qualitatively in accordance with UIP for the exchange rate response to SOE interest rate
changes. We take this asymmetry of exchange rate responses to monetary policy shocks of di¤erent
origin to be suggestive of a special role of US interest rates and assets. The model presented in the
following section is intended to provide an explanation for this asymmetry based on the liquidity
value of US treasuries.
3 The model
In this section, we derive a modied UIP condition, which allows explaining the exchange rate
dynamics presented in the empirical section. For this, we model a liquidity premium on US
treasuries, which is  inter alia a¤ected by the stance of monetary policy. While the focus of
the paper is on exchange rate dynamics induced by a modied UIP condition, the determination
of the liquidity premium and, in particular, the role of monetary policy requires modelling a
full dynamic general equilibrium framework. For simplicity, we abstract from structural relations
stemming from international transactions as far as possible and develop a model of the US as a
large open economy. The model is based on Reynard and Schabert (2013), who specify the central
banks supply of money as an asset exchange, i.e. an exchange of money against eligible securities.
Investors are aware about the fact that only treasury bills are eligible, such that the latter are
valued di¤erently from non-eligible assets. To give a preview, the investorsvaluation of liquidity
and, thus, the liquidity premium on treasuries will vary with the stance of US monetary policy,
while they are not a¤ected by foreign shocks.
Households There are innitely many households i 2 [0; 1], who are innitely lived and have
identical endowments and identical preferences. They enter period t with holdings of money,
Mi;t 1  0, short-term treasuries, Bi;t 1  0, and foreign currency denominated bonds Bi;t 1  0.
Then, they participate in open market operations before they enter the goods market and the asset
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market.8 In open market operations money is supplied outright or under repurchase agreements
(repos) against eligible securities. We assume that only domestic government bonds are eligible,
such that household i faces the following constraint:
Ii;t  Bi;t 1=Rmt ; (1)
where the relative price of money Rmt is controlled by the central bank. Households then enter the
nal goods market, where money is assumed to be the only accepted means of payment. Thus,
the household i0s goods market expenditures are restricted by the cash constraint
Ptci;t  Ii;t +Mi;t 1; (2)
where Pt denotes the price level. We assume that consumption ci;t is a bundle of home chi;t
and foreign goods cfi;t, ci:t = (c
h
i;t)
1 (cfi;t)
 , where   0, such that cost minimizing demand
for each good is given by chi;t = (1   ) PtPht ci;t and c
f
i;t = 
Pt
StP
f
t
ci;t and the price index is Pt = 
P ht = (1  )
1 
(StP
f
t =)
 .
In the asset market, household i receives payo¤s from maturing assets and can reinvest in
treasuries, household debt, foreign bonds, and money. Before the asset market opens, it can
repurchase treasuries, BRi;t = R
m
t M
R
i;t. The budget constraint thus reads
(Bi;t=Rt) +Mi;t + St(B

t =R

t ) + (R
m
t   1) Ii;t + Ptci;t + Pt t (3)
Bi;t 1 +Mi;t 1 + StBt 1 +Wtni;t + Pt't;
where St denotes the nominal exchange rate,Wt the nominal wage rate, ni;t working time,  t lump-
sum tax, and 't prots from rms. Household i
0s borrowing is restricted by Mi;t  0, Bi;t  0,
and a no-Ponzi game condition in terms of foreign bonds.9 Household i maximizes the expected
sum of a discounted stream of instantaneous utilities u :
E0
1X
t=0
tu (ci;t; ni;t) ; (4)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set,  2 (0; 1) is the
subjective discount factor, and the period utility function is u (ci;t; ni;t) = (1   ) 1c1 i;t   (1 +
!) 1n1+!i;t with ; ; !  0, subject to (1), (2), (3) and the borrowing constraints, for given initial
valuesMi; 1, Bi; 1, andBi; 1. The rst order conditions for working time, consumption, additional
8A detailed discussion of the timing of events and the ow of funds can be found in Reynard and Schabert (2013).
9Note that in the asset market the central bank reinvests its payo¤s from maturing government bonds in newly
issued bonds and leaves aggregate money supply unchanged,
R 1
0
Mi;tdi =
R 1
0
(Mi;t 1 + Ii;t  MRi;t)di.
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money, as well as for holdings of government bonds, money, and foreign bonds are:  ui;nt=wt = i;t;
ui;ct= i;t +  i;t; (5)
Rmt
 
i;t + i;t

= i;t +  i;t; (6)
RtEt
 
i;t+1 + i;t+1

 1t+1

= i;t; (7)
Et
 
i;t+1 +  i;t+1

 1t+1

= i;t; (8)
RtEt

(St+1=St)i;t+1
 1
t+1

= i;t; (9)
where t denotes the ination rate t = Pt=Pt 1, wt the real wage rate wt =Wt=Pt, and i;t,  i;t,
as well as i;t the multiplier on the collateral constraint (1), the goods market constraint (2), and
the asset market constraint (3). Finally, the following complementary slackness conditions hold
in the households optimum i:) 0  bi;t 1 1t   Rmt ii;t, i;t  0, i;t
 
bi;t 1 1t  Rmt ii;t

= 0, and
ii:) 0  ii;t + mi;t 1 1t   ci;t,  i;t  0,  i;t
 
ii;t +mi;t 1 1t   ci;t

= 0, where mi;t = Mi;t=Pt,
bi;t = Bi;t=Pt, and ii;t = Ii;t=Pt, as well as (3) with equality and associated transversality conditions.
Relating the rst order condition for treasuries (7) to the rst order condition for money holdings
(8), and using (5) and (6) to substitute out the multipliers, shows that the treasury rate equals
the expected policy rate up to rst order:
1=Rt =
Et
 
1=Rmt+1
  (ui;ct+1=t+1)
Et (ui;ct+1=t+1)
(10)
A comparison of (7) with the rst order condition for foreign bonds (9), which are not eligible
in open market operations, shows that the long-run (real) treasury rate R can be smaller than
the long-run rate of return on foreign bonds R (for limt!1St+1=St = 1), if domestic treasuries
exhibit a liquidity value, which is measured by the multiplier t on the collateral constraint (1).
We therefore interpret this spreads as a liquidity premium.
Firms The production sector is standard. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive
intermediate producers indexed with j 2 [0; 1]. Intermediate goods are purchased by perfectly
competitive bundlers, who bundle/produce the nal domestic consumption good yt according to
y
 1

t =
R 1
0 y
 1

jt dj, leading to a demand yjt = (P
h
jt=P
h
t )
 yt, with (P ht )1  =
R 1
0 (P
h
jt)
1 di (P hjt and
P ht being the price of good j and the aggregate price level for domestic goods). Intermediate goods
producing rms produce the amount yjt applying the technology yjt = atnjt, where labor pro-
ductivity at follows an exogenous rst order autoregressive process. Labor demand thus satises:
mcjt = wt(Pt=P
h
jt)=at, where mc denotes real marginal costs. Staggered price setting forces a mea-
sure  2 [0; 1) of rms to adjust the previous period price with average ination, while the measure
1  chooses new prices P hjt as the solution to maxPhjt Et
P1
s=0 
sqt;t+s(P
h
jtyjt+s P ht+smct+syjt+s),
s.t. yjt+s = (P
h
j;t)
 (P ht+s)yt+s, where qt;t+s is the stochastic discount factor. The rst or-
der condition for their price P
h
jt is given by Zt =

 1Z1;t=Z2;t, where Zt = P
h
jt=P
h
t , Z1;t =
9
c t ytmct + Et(Ht+1=H)Z1;t+1, Z1;t = c
 
t yt + Et(
H
t+1=
H) 1Z2;t+1 and Ht = P ht =P ht 1.
Using the demand constraint, we obtain 1 = (1  )Zt1  + (Ht =H) 1. Given that aggregate
labor input is nt =
R 1
0 njtdj and njt =

P hjt=P
h
t
 
yt, aggregate domestic output depends on the
price dispersion, yt = atnt=st, where st 
R 1
0

P hj;t=P
h
t
 
dj and st = (1 )Zt +st 1(Ht =H)
given s 1.
Public sector The government issues short-term nominally risk-free bonds BTt , which are either
held by domestic households Bt, foreign households BFt , or the central bank B
C
t , B
T
t = Bt+B
C
t +
BFt . We assume that the supply of short-term treasuries is exogenous and we assume that it follows
a constant growth rate
BTt =  B
T
t 1; (11)
where   > . To avoid further e¤ects of scal policy, we assume that the government can raise tax
revenues in a non-distortionary way, Pt t, such that the government budget constraint is given by 
BTt =Rt

+ Pt
m
t + Pt t = B
T
t 1, where Ptmt denotes central bank transfers.
The central bank supplies money in exchange for treasuries in form of outright sales/purchases
Mt and repurchase agreements MRt . At the beginning of each period, the central banks stock of
treasuries equals BCt 1 and the stock of outstanding money equalsMt 1, it then receives an amount
Rmt It of treasuries in exchange for money It, and after repurchase agreements are settled its holdings
of treasuries reduces by BRt and the amount of outstanding money by M
R
t = B
R
t , such that its
budget constraint reads
 
BCt =Rt

+ Pt
m
t = (It=R
m
t ) + B
C
t 1   BRt +Mt  Mt 1  
 
It  MRt

. In
accordance with central bank practice, we assume that the central bank transfers interest earnings
to the government, Ptmt = B
C
t (1  1=Rt)+(Rmt   1)
 
Mt  Mt 1 +MRt

, and that it rolls over its
maturing assets. Substituting out Ptmt and It with It =Mt Mt 1+MRt , in the budget constraint,
shows that central bank holdings of treasuries evolve according to BCt  BCt 1 =Mt Mt 1. Further
restricting the initial values BC 1 andM 1 to satisfy BC 1 =  M 1, we get the central bank balance
sheet constraint
BCt =Mt:
Following large parts of the literature, we assume that the central bank sets the policy rate ac-
cording to a simple feedback rule
Rmt =
 
Rmt 1

(Rm)1  (t=)(1 )(yt=y)y(1 ) exp("r;t); (12)
where Rm > 1,   0,   0, and y  0, and "r;t is a normally distributed i.i.d. random variable
with Et 1"r;t = 0. The central bank further sets an ination target, which is consistent with the
long-run ination rate and satises  > . To give a preview, we set the growth rate of T-bills
  equal to the central banks ination target,   = , which for the US accords to the estimated
growth rate of T-bills (corrected by GDP growth) for the sample period 1966-2007 (see Reynard
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and Schabert, 2013). Finally, the central bank sets the ratio of money supplies under both types
of open market operations 
 :MRt = 
 Mt.
Equilibrium Given that households (rms) behave in an identical way, we will omit individual
indices in the subsequent analysis. We assume that foreign households also consume domestically
produced goods c;ht , such that market clearing for domestically produced goods demands yt =
cht + c
;h
t . They further have access to domestic treasuries (B
F
t ), which implies that aggregate
resources of the domestic economy are restricted by yt = ct (BFt =Rt)+BFt 1+St(Bt =Rt ) StBt 1.
As argued by Canzoneri et al. (2013b), foreign households can also assign a positive transaction
value to domestic currency, if it serves as a key currency for international trade, like the US dollar.
Accordingly, foreign agents hold domestic assets not only as they provide a store of value, but
they also value domestic assets for their ability to provide access to domestic currency. In a forex
market equilibrium, exchange rate dynamics will therefore be a¤ected by liquidity premia on key
currency assets, consistent with (7).
We abstract from further international linkages and assume that the domestic economy is large,
in the sense that  = 0. We view this as an reasonable approximation of the relation between the
US economy and small open economies (which we also consider for the empirical analysis). Under
this assumption, the model simplies by BFt = 0, c
;h
t = 0, yt = c
h
t , Pt = P
h
t , and ct = c
h
t , such
that all foreign variables except for the foreign interest rate Rt are irrelevant. Accounting for the
evidence provided in section 2, we allow for a positive correlation between the foreign interest rate
Rt and the domestic treasury rate Rt. Without attempting to model a full account of international
repercussions of US policy decisions, we simply assume an empirically plausible degree of reaction
of the foreign interest rate to the domestic treasury rate in specifying
Rt = R
  (Rt=R)  "t , (13)
with  > 0 and "t being a random mean zero disturbance that depends entirely on foreign factors
and  governing the degree of adjustment. The full set of equilibrium conditions for  = 0
can be found in Appendix A. It should be noted that the model exhibits the classical property
of an indetermined level of the exchange rate, which is mainly due to the large open economy
assumption. Throughout the subsequent analysis, we will therefore focus on the behavior of the
rate of depreciation EtSt+1=St, satisfying (9).
4 Liquidity premia and exchange rates
In this section, we show how the existence of a liquidity premium and its response to changes in the
domestic monetary policy rate can a¤ect the exchange rate response consistent with the empirical
evidence. Throughout the subsequent analysis, we restrict our attention to the case where the
goods market constraint, Ptct  Mt +MRt , is binding, such that monetary policy is non-neutral.
Combining (5) and (8) leads to uct = Et(uct+1=t+1)+ t in equilibrium, which can be written as
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 t=uct = 1  1=REulert , where REulert is dened as 1=REulert = Et uct+1uctt+1 and will be called "Euler
equation rate", following Canzoneri et al. (2007). An Euler equation rate larger than one thus
indicates a positive valuation for money and implies that households will not hold more money
than for consumption expenditures. Then,  t > 0 and the goods market constraint is binding.
Now consider the collateral constraint (1), which in equilibrium reads
Bt 1=Rmt Mt  Mt 1 +MRt : (14)
Using (5), (6), and (8), shows that its multiplier t satises t=uct = (1=R
m
t )   (1=REulert ) in
equilibrium. Hence, when the policy rate is smaller than the Euler rate, Rmt < R
Euler
t , the
multiplier is positive t > 0 and the collateral constraint (14) is binding. In this case, the goods
market constraint is binding as well,  t > 0, given that R
m
t  1. When households get money
in exchange for treasuries at a price, Rmt   1, which is below their marginal valuation of money,
REulert   1, they use treasuries to get as much money as until (14) is binding. As a consequence,
there exists a premium between treasuries and non-eligible assets which increases with the liquidity
value of treasuries t. When the policy rate increases, the price of money in terms of treasuries also
increases, such that the liquidity value of treasuries falls. For a given value of the Euler equation
rate, the liquidity premium is therefore negatively a¤ected by the policy rate.
Combining the rst order condition for treasuries (7) with the rst order condition for foreign
bonds (9), leads to the following arbitrage freeness condition, which relates to a uncovered interest
rate parity condition:
Et((St+1=St) (t+1=t+1))
Et (t+1=t+1)
=
Rt
Rt
 Et
 
1 + t+1=t+1

(t+1=t+1)

Et (t+1=t+1)
; (15)
which can, more compactly, be written as  t = (Rt=Rt )  t. According to (15) the term on
the RHS,  t =
Et((St+1=St)(t+1=t+1))
Et(t+1=t+1)
, which  up to rst order  equals the expected rate of
depreciation, does not only depend on the spread between the domestic and the foreign interest
rate, but is also a¤ected by the liquidity premium t =
Et[(1+t+1=t+1)(t+1=t+1)]
Et(t+1=t+1)
. Given that
the latter is negatively related to the domestic policy rate, it tends to counteract the e¤ect of
the policy rate on the interest spread (see RHS of 15). For a simplied version of the model, it
can be shown that the existence of the liquidity premium leads to substantially di¤erent exchange
rate dynamics, in particular, when the linkage between domestic and foreign interest rates is large
enough (see 13).
Proposition 1 Consider a version of the model under a binding collateral constraint with  =
  =  = 1; 
 ! 1, and  = y = 0. The liquidity premium decreases with the domestic policy
rate, @t=@Rmt < 0 if  > 0. Further,
1. an increase in the domestic policy rate leads to an increase in  t and, up to rst order, to
an expected future appreciation (depreciation) if  > 1   (if  < 1  ), and
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2. an increase in the foreign interest rate leads to an increase in  t and, up to rst order, to
an expected future appreciation (depreciation).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The results summarized in the proposition show that the existence of the liquidity premium
and its endogenous reaction to an increase in the domestic policy rate, can revert the response of
expected exchange rate changes. In contrast, a change in the foreign interest rate, which does not
alter the liquidity premium on domestic treasuries, leads to a exchange rate response consistent
with standard UIP. The condition presented in the part 1. of the proposition further shows that the
co-movement between the foreign and the domestic interest rate is also decisive for the exchange
rate response. Only if  (see 13) is positive, such that the change in the interest rate spread is
less pronounced than the change in the domestic interest rate, the endogenous response of the
liquidity premium can lead to a reversal of the exchange rate dynamics. Since the US policy
rate is empirically highly persistent, 1   is a rather small quantity such that a limited and thus
empirically plausible degree of co-movement  su¢ ces to fulll the condition (see below).
5 Numerical results
The above proposition showed the models implications for exchange rate dynamics under the
simplifying assumption of an exogenous policy rate as well as for some other special parameter
values chosen in order to be able to derive analytical results. Here, we present numerical evidence
for a parameterized version of the model that abstains from these simplications.
For the purposes of this section, we choose model parameters as follows. We specify for the
intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption and for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
 = ! = 1:5; which we consider a reasonable trade-o¤ between diverging estimates resulting from
microeconomic and macroeconomic data.10 We further choose  to calibrate working time in the
steady state to equal n = 0:33: The degree of price stickiness is chosen to match typical macro
estimates and is set at  = 0:75 (an intermediate value lying between the estimates of Smets and
Wouters (2007) and Justiniano and Preston (2010) for the US, which are between 0:65 and 0:90),
and the absolute price elasticity is  = 10.
The parameters of the Taylor rule are based on Mehra and Minton (2007) to be  = 1:5,
y = 0:78, and persistence  = 0:73, where for simulations we also follow their results in choosing
the standard deviation of the innovation to the Taylor rule as 0:326 per cent. We assume that the
logarithm of labor productivity follows an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coe¢ cient a
equal to 0:9. We set the standard deviation of the innovation to this process, "a;t, to a value such
10Card (1994) suggests a range of 0.2 to 0.5 for the Frisch elasticity while Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate
! = 1:92. With respect to the intertemporal substitutability of consumption, Barsky et al. (1997) estimate an
elasticity of 0.18 using micro data, implying a value of around 5 for . Macroeconomic data generally implies lower
estimates, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate  = 1:39:
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that the overall standard deviation of simulated output matches the standard value of 1:5 per cent.
This requires a standard deviation of "a;t of 0:98 per cent. The parameter 
 is the share of reserves
supplied in repurchase operations to total reserves, which we set at 
 = 1 (we checked that all
results are robust to variations in this value). The steady state ination rate target  (equal to
the growth of T-bills  ) and the long-run policy rate Rm are set to the 20-year averages of U.S.
consumer price ination and, respectively, the Federal Funds rate,  = 1:00575 and Rm = 1:0105:
The discount factor  is calibrated to match a steady state liquidity premium of 65 basis points,
which follows Canzoneri et al. (2007) who choose this value as the empirical average di¤erence
between the interest rate for high-quality (AAA) borrowers and the interest rate on 3 months
treasury bills. Thus, the discount factor is set to  = 
Rm+6510 4 = 0:9889. Regarding the foreign
interest rate (13), we set  to the ratio of the maximum of the empirical average small economy
interest rate response to the maximum of the empirical US policy rate response, which in the
empirical estimates presented above in gure 2 is about 0:54.11 Foreign interest rate shocks "t
are assumed to be serially correlated with an autocorrelation of , and their standard deviation is
chosen to ensure that the foreign interst rate shows the same volatility as the domestic one.
5.1 Responses to monetary policy shocks
We present percentage impulse responses to a one percent shock to the disturbance "r;t in the
monetary policy rule based on a log-linear approximation of the model. Our focus is on exchange
rate dynamics, such that we show the responses of the variables entering the modied interest rate
parity condition (15). Thus, gure 2 shows the responses of the interest rate di¤erential Rt  Rt ,
the liquidity premium t, and the expected nominal depreciation rate EtSt+1=St.
As argued above, the empirical results shown in gure 1 point out that typically the foreign
interest rate does change positively in response to a shock to US policy rates. This is important in
the present context since ignoring this international interest rate linkage would lead us to overstate
the consequences of US interest rate shocks on interest rate di¤erentials, which are decisive for
exchange rate dynamics in (15), in particular, when, as in our model, endogenous changes in the
liquidity premium tend to move the exchange rate in a di¤erent direction (see proposition 1).
The solid lines in gure 2 show that after a US monetary policy shock that raises the policy
interest rate Rmt , the bond rate Rt rises, too, and thus there is an increase in the international
interest rate di¤erential Rt   Rt . The liquidity premium declines, as described in section 2.
From the modied interest rate parity condition (15), all else equal, the increase in the interest
rate di¤erential would tend to lead to a future depreciation, while the decrease in the liquidity
premium would lower it. Since the international interest rate connection is set at an empirically
plausible value ( = 0:54), the interest rate di¤erential responds less strongly to a contractionary
11Note that this does not accomodate any humps in the responses, which are present empirically but not replicated
by the model.
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Figure 2: Responses to one percentage point increase in domestic policy interest rate shock
US monetary shock, and the same amount of decrease in the liquidity premium leads to an expected
exchange rate appreciation (a negative response of EtSt+1=St). In this way, the model is able to
explain the negative relation between the interest rate di¤erential and the depreciation rate that
is observed in the data.
For comparison, the dashed lines show the impulse responses for  = 0, which is the case of no
international interest rate linkage. In this case, the domestic monetary policy induced interest rate
shock translates into a much stronger interest rate di¤erential. Since the response of the liquidity
premium is necessarily the same as before, it turns out that the e¤ect working through the interest
rate di¤erential dominates for this parameterization, such that the model implies a counterfactual
increase in the depreciation rate. In this case, the existence of the liquidity premium modies the
result quantitatively, but does not imply a qualitative departure from UIP.
In the rightmost panel, the red dotted line is the corresponding empirical estimate of the
depreciation rate following a US interest rate shock for comparison (recall that in the VAR we
used above, as common in the empirical literature, the nominal (log) exchange rate entered as
a variable, whereas in the theoretical discussion here we focus on the slope of the exchange rate
response, namely the rate of depreciation. In the gure, the red line represents the depreciation
rate that is implicit in our empirically estimated log exchange rate response, obtained by converting
the empirical response as shown in gure 1 to its quarterly equivalent and then taking the forward
di¤erence). The overall pattern of the empirical (red) response of the depreciation rate is in line
with the one in our preferred specication (solid black). Although we emphasize that the model
as it stands is deliberately stylized and not suited to closely match the properties of data, its
predictions are nonetheless in qualitative accordance with empirical observation.
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Figure 3: Responses to one percentage point increase in foreign (SOE) policy interest rate shock
Figure 3 shows the response to a negative autocorrelated shock to the foreign (SOE) interest
rate innovation "t . Approximating the observed weak response of the US interest rate to a SOE
interest rate shock (see gure 1), our model implies that the domestic (i.e. US) interest rate
does not respond. By construction, since it is assumed that the domestic economy is large, the
foreign interest rate shock does not a¤ect domestic variables and the liquidity premium does not
change. Hence, the result as shown in the rightmost panel can be seen to be the standard UIP
prediction, namely a positive association between the interest rate di¤erential (here brought about
by a decrease in the foreign interest rate Rt ) and the depreciation rate. The sign of the response
of the depreciation rate is consistent with what we observed in the VAR analysis (see red line),
whereas the magnitude of the response is clearly overstated, a property that our model shares with
all models that imply a standard UIP condition.
5.2 Unconditional correlations
So far we have looked at the response of the depreciation rate to interest rate innovations induced
by monetary policy shocks. The purpose was to demonstrate that the model with liquidity premia
is able to account for the empirical evidence on the exchange rate e¤ects of monetary policy shocks,
as exemplied by the results in section 2 above. However, the empirical literature has shown that
the UIP prediction fails not only conditional on monetary policy shocks, but also unconditionally.
This is evidenced in the kind of empirical tests conducted by Fama (1984) and many others sur-
veyed in Froot and Thaler (1992) and Engel (2013). The negative association between interest
rate di¤erentials and depreciation rates seems to hold in general. In this section, we therefore
look beyond responses to monetary policy shocks, and present the limitations of our model when
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facing the challenge to produce an unconditional association between interest rate di¤erentials and
expected depreciation as found in the data. We do so by stochastically simulating the model and
then performing regressions with the articial data. The simulations assume normally distributed
domestic interest rate shocks, foreign interest rate shocks, and technology shocks with autoregres-
sive properties and variances as described above. We generate articial time series of length 500,
and the results presented below are based on averages of 1000 runs.
The empirical literature on UIP typically uses a regression of the following type (see e.g. the
survey by Froot and Thaler, 1992),
Et bSt+1   bSt = 0 +   bRt   bRt+ t; (16)
where 0 and  are parameters to be estimated, t is stochastic disturbance term, and carets denote
loglinearized terms. To connect this to the discussion of our model, note that log-linearizing the
modied interest rate parity condition (15) and rearranging we arrive at
Et bSt+1   bSt = bRt   bRt +ct: (17)
The standard test of UIP in the empirical literature is to run the regression (16) on empirical data
and test the hypothesis that 0 = 0 and  = 1. By looking at the theoretical expression in (17), one
sees that this hypothesis is true if the liquidity premium is zero. Otherwise, if our model is true and
the liquidity premium is non-negligible, the standard UIP regression su¤ers from omitted variable
bias. Our question in this section is whether omitting the (empirically unobservable) premium in
estimated UIP regressions can explain their reported empirical test results. It is well known that
econometric estimates of (16) typically nd coe¢ cient values of  notably smaller than one, and
often even negative.
Here, we assess what an econometrician would nd in a world characterized by our model.
For the regressions, we use the realized depreciation rate bSt   bSt 1 from the model simulations
and regress it on the model interest rate di¤erential bRt 1   bRt 1, since this is the data that an
econometrician not observing expectations would have to work with in empirical work with real
world data. However, we emphasize that the results would change only very little if we took the
models true expected depreciation rate Et bSt+1   bSt and regressed it on bRt   bRt , instead.
Using this procedure, we get an average (over 1000 simulation runs) regression coe¢ cient 
of 0:4370 with an average standard error of 0:0451. Recall that if we ran the same simulations
in a model without liquidity premia, the estimated coe¢ cient would be centered on 1, the value
predicted by the standard UIP relation. In the present model where liquidity premia are present,
the estimated coe¢ cients are statistically signicantly smaller than 1 due to the inuence of the
omitted liquidity premium variable. However, the empirical literature often nds negative coe¢ -
cients (Froot and Thaler, 1992, report a mean estimate for  of  0:8 over various studies), which
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cannot be replicated by the model. The reason is that we also assume that there are shocks to
the foreign interest rate. Since there is no liquidity premium associated with foreign assets, these
foreign interest rate shocks entail a partial e¤ect that is consistent with UIP, and would thus (when
taken in isolation) produce a  coe¢ cient of 1. The overall regression coe¢ cient that we estimate
then reects the combined e¤ects of the modied UIP relation in the case of domestic monetary
policy and productivity shocks and standard UIP dynamics in case of foreign interest rate shocks.
To see this more clearly, we repeated the simulations setting the volatility of foreign interest rate
shocks to zero. The estimated average coe¢ cient  in this case is  1:2360 with an average stan-
dard error of 0:0273. Thus, in this scenario the model replicates the nding of a strongly negative
slope coe¢ cient as found in much of the empirical literature. Thus, to explain the unconditional
correlation one would have to assume that US monetary policy and technology shocks account for
the largest part of the variance of exchange rates.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the role of liquidity premia for exchange rate dynamics. We apply a macro-
economic approach to liquidity premia on short-term treasuries originating from monetary policy
implementation. The liquidity premium leads to a modication of uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP), which contributes to explaining observed deviations from the latter. Specically, the en-
dogenous reaction of the liquidity premium to interest rate changes can lead to a future appreciation
when the domestic interest rate is relatively high.
We provide empirical evidence that this pattern is particularly relevant for changes in interest
rates on US treasuries, which are known to provide transaction services, both nationally and
internationally. In contrast, our panel VAR analysis shows that changes in the interest rate of a
small open economy leads to exchange rate responses that are consistent with UIP predictions.
The liquidity premia approach presented in this paper thus helps to understand exchange rate
responses to monetary policy shocks. However, since these arguably account for a limited fraction
of the total variance of exchange rates, our theory does not provide a solution for the forward
premium puzzle.
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Appendix
A Equilibrium conditions for the large open economy
In equilibrium, aggregate asset holdings satisfy B()t =
R
B
()
i;t di, M
R
t =
R 1
0 M
R
i;tdi, Mt =
R 1
0 Mi;tdi;R
Ii;tdi = It = Mt  Mt 1 +MRt , and BTt = Bt + BCt . Assuming that the domestic economy is
large,  = 0 and BFt = 0, implies that c
;h
t = 0, yt = c
h
t , Pt = P
h
t and ct = c
h
t hold. We can then
summarize the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) as a set of sequences for fct; nt; wt; mt,
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Rt
t+1

=Et

St+1
St
t+1
t
Rt
t+1

; (28)
Z1t = [= (  1)]c t yt (wt=at) +  Ett+1Z1t+1; (29)
Z2t = c
 
t yt + 
1 Et 1t+1Z
2
t+1; (30)
1= (1  )  Z1t =Z2t 1 " + 1  1t ; (31)
yt= ct; (32)
yt= atnt=st; (33)
st= (1  )
 
Z1t =Z
2
t
 
+  st 1t; (34)
Rmt = (R
m)1 
 
Rmt 1

(t=)
(1 ) (yt=y)y(1 ) exp("r;t); (35)
Rt =R
(Rt=R) exp("t ); (36)
and the transversality conditions, a monetary policy setting fRmt  1g1t=0 according to (12),

t > 0, and   , and a scal policy setting    1, for given sequences of stochastic variables
fat,"r;t; "t g1t=0, and initial values MH 1 > 0, B 1 > 0, BT 1 > 0, and s 1  1.
21
B Appendix to section 4
Suppose that the average policy rate and the ination target satisfy Rm < = and  >  )
REuler > 1, where variables without time index denote steady state values. Then, the collateral
constraint (14) as well as the cash constraint (2) are binding in the steady state, given that their
multiplier are strictly positive,  = c [(1=Rm)   =] > 0 and  = c [1   =] > 0. For the
parameter values  =   =  = 1, and 
 ! 1, a REE in a neighborhood of this steady state
reduces a to set of sequences fct; nt; wt; mRt ; bt; mct; Z1t ; Z2t ; t; st; Rt ; Rt; Rmt ; t; t; Et St+1St g1t=0
and P0 > 0 satisfying (27)-(36), n!t = c
 1
t wt=R
Euler
t ;
t= Et[c
 1
t+1=t+1]; (37)
1=REulert = Et

c 1t+1=
 
c 1t t+1

; (38)
Et
c 1t+1
t+1
=RtEt
c 1t+1
t+1Rmt+1
; (39)
ct=m
R
t ; (40)
mRt =
bt 1=t
Rmt
; (41)
bt= bt 1=t; (42)
and the transversality conditions, a monetary policy setting fRmt  1g1t=0 according to (12), for
given sequences of stochastic variables fat,"r;t; "t g1t=0, and initial values B 1 > 0, BT 1 > 0, and
s 1  1.
Proof of proposition 1. Consider the modied UIP condition (15), which can be written as
 t = (Rt=R

t )  t; (43)
where t =
Et[(1+t+1=t+1)(t+1=t+1)]
Et(t+1=t+1)
and  t =
Et((St+1=St)(t+1=t+1))
Et(t+1=t+1)
. Combining (40) and (41)
to ct = bt 1=(Rmt t) as well as (37) and (38) to ctt = 1=REulert , gives t = t(Rmt =REulert )=bt 1.
Using the latter and (27) to substitute out the multipliers t+1 and t+1, the terms  t and t in
(43) can be written as
t =
1
Et(Rmt+1=R
Euler
t+1 )
and  t =
Et((St+1=St) (R
m
t+1=R
Euler
t+1 ))
Et(Rmt+1=R
Euler
t+1 )
: (44)
Replacing consumption in (38) with ct = bt 1=(Rmt t), and substituting out bt with (42), leads to
Rmt =R
Euler
t = EtR
m
t+1. Given that monetary policy satises  = y = 0, such that (35) simplies
to Rmt = (R
m)1 
 
Rmt 1

exp("r;t), the ratio Rmt =R
Euler
t satises
Rmt =R
Euler
t = (R
m
t )
  (Rm)(1 ) exp[(1=2)var("r;t)]: (45)
where we used that Et exp("t+1)x = exp[(1=2)
 
x2

var("r;t)]. Hence, the terms in (44) can be
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simplied to
t= (1=R
m
t )
2  1, (46)
 t=Et (St+1=St) + covt (St+1=St; exp("r;t+1)
) exp[ 2(1=2)var("r;t)]; (47)
where 1 = (Rm) (1+)(1 )(1=) exp[ 
 
1 + 2

(1=2)var("r;t)] is constant. Thus, (46) implies
that t is strictly decreasing in the policy rate if  > 0, which establishes the rst claim in the
proposition.
Using (13), to substitute out the foreign rate Rt in (43), leads to  t = R
1 
t [(R
=R) "t ]
 1 t.
Now use the arbitrage freeness condition (10) and substitute out c 1t+1 with c
 1
t+1 = t+1R
Euler
t+1 and
t+1=t+1 with t+1=t+1 = (Rmt+1=R
Euler
t+1 )=bt, leading to Rt = EtR
m
t+1 and by using the policy
rule (35) to Rt = Et

(Rmt )
 (Rm)1  exp("r;t+1)

, which can be used to write the RHS of (43) in
terms of the current policy rate Rmt ;
 t =

(Rmt )
Et [exp("r;t+1)] (R
m)1 
1 
[(R=R) "t ]
 1  t:
Applying the expressions of t and  t in (46) and (47), we get
Et (St+1=St) + t = (R
m
t )
 ( (1 )) (1="t )  2; (48)
where 2 = (R=R) (1=) (Rm)( 1)(+) exp[ 
 
2 + 

(1=2)var("r;t)] is constant and the term
t depends on a potentially time varying second order term, t = covt (St+1=St; exp("r;t+1)) 
exp[ 2(1=2)var("r;t)]. Hence, (48) implies that if  > 1    ( < 1   ) an increase in the
domestic policy rate leads to an appreciation (a depreciation) up to rst order. An increase in the
foreign interest rate, which is induced by a increase in "t , is as well, up to rst order, associated
with an subsequent appreciation of the domestic currency.
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